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1. Introduction
Should the pay-as-you-go pension system (PAYGO system) be replaced witha ffinded
system, and if so, why? Many authors have expressed many different opinions on this
problem, and the matter has been analyzed within highly sophisticated theoretical and
empirical models. Some authors, like Feldstein (1995), Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser
(1998), Feldstein and Samwick (1998) or BOrsch-Supan (1998) and, most noiably, Homburg
(1990, 1997), have constructed models that generate efficiency gains from a transition to a
funded system. Others, like Fenge (1995, 1997), Brunner (1996), Sinn (1997, 1998a), the
Council of Advisors to the German Ministry of Economics (Wissenschafflicher Beirat beim
Bundesminjsterjum für Wirtsehaft 1998), and Geanakopolos, Mitchell, and Zeldes (1998),
some of whom were inspired by seminal articles of Ludeke (1988) and Breyer (1989), have
argued that a Pareto improving transition to a funded system is not possible.
This paper will not try to reinvent the wheel, but it can, and will, do two things.
First, it will offer a set of explicit formal present value comparisons between the two
systems which are, broadly speaking, in the spirit of the German debate about pension reform
from Ludeke and Breyer to the Council of Advisors, but have not, to the best of the author's
knowledge, been formally derived before (though they cover the classroom material the
author usually presents in his lectures on social policy at the University ofMunich). The
comparisons will make it clear which arguments the advocates of a funded system should. not
use to defend their case.
Second, the paper will offer another reason why funding pensions might be useful.
This reason relates to the imminent crises of the pension systems of the western world and the
lack of human capital formation.3
2. A False Reason for Advocating the Funded System
The most frequent reason given in the public policy debate for a funded system is the
apparently superior performance of the capital market in terms of the rate of return on
investment it can offer. Indeed, many studies have shown how poor the rate of return on
PAYGO pension contributions really is.
The result of a study carried out by the Center for Economic Studies for the Council of
Advisors to the German Ministry of Economics' is illustrated in figure 1. In that study the real
internal rates of return for alternative age cohorts of average German pension contributors
were calculated. The cohorts enter the system at the age of 20 and contribute continually
thereafter. Their rate of return is shown for the respective entrance years, where 1957 is the
year when the 'dynamic' pension system was introduced in Germany. Some members of the
cohort die before they receive a pension, some receive disability pensions, some receive old
age pensions. Some leave widows and orphans who then receive pensions. In theory, the rate
of return should equal the rate of growth of the sum of wages, and the figure shows that this is
roughly true if the compound annual growth rate over a 50 year period starting at the
respective entrance year is taken as a yardstick. In the calculations up to 1997 actual growth
data were used and thereafter an annual increase in the wage rate of 2%, coupled with the
medium demographic forecast of the Federal Statistical Office, was assumed.
The figure also shows the compound annual rate of interest of a repeated investment in
ten year German government bonds over a period of 50 years starting at the time a cohort
enters the pension system. Up to 1997 true data were used and for the subsequent years an
interest rate of 4% which is less than the actual rate in the decades before that date was
assumed. Obviously, the rate of return offered by the statutory pension insurance system is
significantly lower than that offered by the capital market. Those who entered the system at
IWissenschaftlicherBeirat beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft (1998) and Sinn (1999).4
the age of 20 when it was founded in 1957 and who will receive their pensions in the year
2002 would have been able to earn a return of 4.2% in the capital market, but the PAYGO
system just gives them 2.8%. And those who enter now will not receive more than 1.5%,
whilethere is no reason to believe that the capital market will generate a return lower than the
one it delivered in the past, that is, a good 4%.
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There is no doubt that the PAYGO system offers a much lower rate of return than the
capital market does. Many observers have interpreted this fact as a sign of a fundamental
intrinsic inefficiency of the PAYGO system andhavetherefore advocated a transition to a
funded system so as to make use of the higher rate of return that the capital market can offer.
However, as the Council pointed out, following the basic insight of LUdeke (1988), this
interpretation is clearly too simple, since the low rate of return of the PAYGO system may
Figure 1: The internal rate of interest in the
German statutory pension insurance system (SPI)
Internal rate of interest ofthe SPT{rca1)
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just be the minor image of the introductory gains of older cohorts which in 1957 were able to
enter the system under overly favorable conditions.2 The PAYGO system is a device that
redistributes wealth from later generations to introductory generations, but it may not
essentially be an institution that wastes economic resources.
Once the introductory gains have been distributed in a PAYGO system, it may be
difficult, if not impossible, to design a Pareto improving transition to a funded system. It is
true that there is a burden imposed on later generations as shown by the rate of return
disadvantage, but, unless the existing pension claims are negated, there may be no way to get
rid of this burden and enjoy true efficiency gains.
Simi (1997, p. 6, equation 1) has expressed this view in present value terms. He argues
that "any pension system, be it PAYGO or funded or a combination of the two, is a zero-sum
game for all the generations participating in the sense that the present value of all
contributions equals the present value of all pensions" and he concludes that the feasible
reform alternatives should be seen as devices for altering the time path of the burden imposed
on later generations which are unable to reduce the size of this burden.3 In the following, this
interpretation will be extended and used to derive a number of equivalence results that may
help illuminate the matter.
3. Implicit Taxes, Implicit Savings and Implicit Government Debt
Assume an overlapping generations structure where in period t there are N/ young persons
who work and N," pensioners who don't. The contribution to the PAYGO system of a young
person is C,andthe per capita pension received by a member of the old generation is J. The
2Cfalso Breyer (1989), Fenge (1995), and Homburg (1990, 1997),
The same interpretation has been given by Geanakopolos, Mitchell, and Zeldes (1998, pp.14-15, esp. fn. 17)
and WissenschafflicherBeirat beiin Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft (1998, pp. 19-20). Cf also Sinn (1998a).6
two fundamental assumptions characterizing a simple PAYGO model are that contributions
are fully used to finance the pensions in the same period,
(1) NC,=NfP,,
and that today's contributors aretomorrow'spensioners:
(2) N7 =
Thepension claims of the old generationshould, as has often been argued, be seen as an
"implicitgovernment debt":
(3) D,=NfP,.
The debt has to be serviced in a similar way to the explicit debt. The difference, however, is
that servicing this debt with the contribution C, generates a new pension claim against the
next generation.
The claim against the next generation may or may not be overpaid with the
contribution when compared with the price of a similar pension claim in the capital market.
Call the part of the contribution that would have been sufficient to buy the PAYGO pension in
the capital market 'implicit saving', 8,, and the remainder 'implicit tax', 2
(4) C,=S,+T,.
Obviously implicit saving is given by the equation7
(5)
I+1
1+/;+
where is the rate of return offered by the capital market for an investment in t that
generates a return in t +I.Theimplicit tax is defined according to (4) as a residual. It is the
part of the contribution which would not have been necessary if the pension claim had been
bought in the capital market and which is lost from the contributor's point of view.4
4. The Implicit Tax and the Internal Rate of Return
Consider first the relationship between the implicit tax and the internal rate of return of the
PAYGO system. Let i,1 denote the internal rate of return enjoyed by the pensioners of period
t+ i.As this rate is implicitly defined such that it makes a person's discounted pension equal
to his contribution.
(+1
/
l+i,÷1
'
Aaron's(1966) well-known equation
rATY
(6)
—(+1/-i-i —1 —
whichshows that the internal rate of return is given by the growth rate of the aggregate
pension or contribution volume can be derived from (1) and (2).8
Let
2,;
'El
indicatethe implicit tax share in a person's contributions. Using (4), (5),(1)and (2) it follows
that
=1—
or, using (6) and rearranging terms,
(7) =+i — i/ti
1+,l
Thisequation, which was also used by Ludeke (1988, P. 171) and Homburg (1997, p. 240),
says that a generation has to pay an implicit tax with its pension contributions if the internal
rate of return provided by the PAYGO system —thegrowth rate of the aggregate pension
volume -issmaller than the market rate of interest.5
In the long run, the growth rate of aggregate pensions will certainly not be able to
exceed the growth rate of GDP and the latter will be less than the rate of interest if the
economy converges toward a steady state to the left of the golden rule point, as it must if an
intertemporal general equilibrium is to exist.6 Also, as was shown in figure 1 and observed by
many authors, the internal rate of return of the pension system empirically tends to be much
See section 7.3 for a further discussion of this point.
Note that the two rates of return showing up in equation (7) do not refer to years but to generations, which
means that they are much higher than the respective annual rates. See figure 2 for the resulting size of the
implicit tax rate.
6
SeeSinn (1980, condition (29)). Niehans (1966) and Homburg (1991) have shown that the availability of a
fixed asset such as land rules out inefficient market solutions.9
lower than the market rate of interest. Thus a positive tax share should be considered the
normal case. Nevertheless, it is clearly possible that generous pension reforms, which imply a
sufficiently strong growth in the share of wages contributed to the pension system, make the
growth rate of the contributions temporarily bigger than that of the sum of wages or GDP. In
this case, the implicit tax could be negative for one or more generations, and the implicit
saving could exceed the pension contribution. All propositions to be derived below are
compatible with this possibility. It is assumed, however, that the implicit tax rate will be
strictly positive beyond some finite point in time.
How large is the implicit tax share under realistic conditions? The data used to
construct figure 1 can also be used to calculate this share in the described annual cohort model
for Germany which follows the spirit of the model presented here. The result is shown in
figure 2.
Figure 2: The saving and tax shares in the contributions
to the German statutory pension system for cohorts with alternative starting years
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Obviously, the current German pension system has alwaysbeen characterized by a
positive tax share in the contributions for thosewho entered the system under regular
conditions. The share was about one third for participants who enteredthe system at the age
of 20 in the foundation year 1957, but, with the passage of time, thesituation has significantly
deteriorated for the contributors. Today, new entrants must envisage thatabout 50% of their
pensions will be taxed away by the government to payfor the introductory gains made by
those who were able to enjoy the benefits of the system without makingthe appropriate
contributions. The situation will be even worse in future. The tax share inthe contributions
will rise towards 60% in the second decade of the 21 century.1
5. The Present Value of the Implicit Tax
How does the implicit tax relate to the implicit government debt? To answerthis question,
substitute for ]÷ in equation (5) according to (1) (where t is replaced with t+1)and multiply
both sides of the equation with Nf taking account of equation (2). This gives
(8) =N7..1C,+1
l+i
or, when C,1 is replaced according to (4):
TN SN
(9) SN =
(#1ltl + (' 1+1
1+t 1+t1
Similarly it follows for any period t +j,j ￿1, that
Thum and von Weizsllcker (1999) calculate the implicit income tax for several reform scenarios in the German
PAGO system. See Beckmann (2000) for an illuminating discussion of the variables on which the implicit tax
share will depend.11
(10) = +
1+ 1+
Inserting(1) and (4) into (3) gives
(11) D,=T,N7+S,N,
which can be written as
(12) D, =JN + +
1+i÷
when(9) is used. The numerator of the last fraction on the right hand side of (12) can be
rep'aced with S,÷JN7J from (10) for /= 1and the same operation can be done with the
numerator of last fraction on the right hand side of the resulting equation when /= 2is
assumed, similarly for /= 3and so on. The result is
(13)
whereis the discount factor for calculating the value in period tofa tax paid in period/:
(14) H l/(1+rk)forj>t and R=l.12
It is assumed that the elements of the sum in (13) converge, which is the case if, beyond some
finite timej, the implicit tax revenue grows at a rate which is smaller than, and bounded away
from, each period's market rate of interest. As (7) reveals that this condition is basically
identical with assuming that the implicit tax is positive beyond some finite point in time,
convergence can be assumed without any additional loss of generality.
Equation (13) reveals two useful propositions.8
Proposition 1: At each point in time during the existence of a FAYGO system the present
value of the implicit taxes to be paid by all subsequent generations equals the value of the
implicit government debt
The second proposition covers a special case of Proposition 1 and follows if it is noted that,
according to (3), D0 =N0'P0:
Proposition 2: The introductory gain of the first generation of retirees equals the present
value of the implicit taxes that have to be paid by all future generations.
Propositions 1 and 2 demonstrate the nature of the PAYGO system as a zero-sum
game among the generations. They show that the burden imposed on the participants of an
existing PAYGO system cannot necessarily be attributed to the inefficiency of the system, but
may simply be a tax which is necessary to service the implicit government debt which was
created with the gifi to the first generation.
The spirit of Proposition I has also been explained by Homburg (1997) with a steady state example where the
sum of wages remains constant and the rate of return in the PAYGO system is zero. Proposition I needs no
assumptions on the time paths of wages, the discount rate, the contribution rate, and the replacement rate other
than the convergence condition.13
Note that servicing the implicit debt does not mean redeeming it. In fact, since (3)
reveals that the implicit debt equals a generation's pension claims which typically grow from
one generation to the next, it is clear that the debt will also increase with the passage of time.
Thus the debt redemption is negative, which means that the implicit interest burden cannot be
fully financed with the implicit tax and needs to be partially covered with new implicitly
borrowed funds. Nevertheless, it is still true that the implicit debt equals the present value of
all future implicit tax payments up to the very last cent.
6. The Transition Question
Let us now consider the transition problem which is at the center of today's policy debate
about the pension problem. In principle, in the PAYGO system all future generations will
participate in servicing the implicit debt created with the gift to the introductory generation.
(Indeed, it follows from (7) and (6) that the implicit wage tax rate would even stay constant if
the economy were on a steady state growth path where the market rate of interest is constant
and where the contributions and the sum of wages grow at the same constant rate.) What
happens to the tax burden when the PAYGO system is replaced with a funded system where a
person's pension contributions are invested in the capital market so as to give this person a
fair pension, one whose present value equals the investment outlay?
Since the existing pension claims will have to be respected and a person's
contributions are fully used for his or her own pension, an explicit tax is necessary to finance
the existing pension claims. A radical reform that maximizes the transition speed makes it
necessary to impose the tax on the current working generation. The volume of this tax is equal
to the implicit government debt and hence equal to the present value of the implicit taxes that
would have been paid by all future generations had the PAYGO system continued to exist. In
fact, this gives a straightforward result.14
Corollary of Proposition 1: A rapid transition to a funded system makes it necessary to
redeem the implicit debt immediately. Such a reform concentrates the tax burden implicit in
the PA YGO system in one period, but does not reduce its size.
Many authors have seen the difficulty of imposing a double burden on the transition
generation and have therefore advocated a more gradual transition by using public debt as a
smoothing device. Some part of the burden, it is argued, should be imposed on the current
working generation and the rest should be financed with long term government debt to be
serviced by all future generations. Will this policy be able to reduce the present value of the
tax burden?
To answer this question only a few formal steps are necessary. Let J), and 27denote
the explicit government debt and the explicit tax used for servicing the debt per member of
the working generation in period 1. From the basic equation of motion
(15)
it follows that
(16) D=T,CNT+
1 +
andin general it holds for arbitrary points in time t+ j, j ￿ 1,that
(17) Df1=271N1+
Substituting in (16) with the respective value that (17) gives for j= 1one gets15
(18) 1+t(1+1+3(l+1,2)
andrepeating this operation with in (18) using (17) with j= 2and so on with
successively higher values ofj results in the expression
D,' =T,?NR,
where R. is again the market discount factor defined in (14) and where again a convergence
of the discounted sum of taxes has to be assumed. This expression resembles (13) perfectly,
and when D1 =Dis chosen, the following proposition is obvious.
Proposition 3: A policy of converting the implicit debt into an explicit debt and distributing
the burden of this debt over the future generations by means of an appropriate redemption
policy will not result in a reduction of the present value of the tax burden. Whatever the
chosen time pattern of the tax burden is, its present value is always equal to the present
value of the implicit tax burden in the FAYGO syste,m
it would even be possible to replicate the time paths of the implicit tax burden and the
implicit debt in the PAYGO system exactly. This can be seen by developing the equation of
motion for the implicit government debt. Deriving D,1 =N,+1C,1from (1) and (3), inserting
this expression into (11) while using (8), and rearranging terms yields
(D, —T1N7)(l+r,,3=D,+1.1.6
A comparison between this equation and (15) shows that a policy of equating the time path of
the explicit tax with the one of the implicit tax in the PAYGO system will generate exactly
the same time path for the government debt, too. Thus another result can be stated.
Proposition 4: With an appropriate borrowing strategy it is possible to design a transition
to afunded system which perfectly mimics the lime paths of the implicit tax and the implicit
debt in an ongoing PA YGO system.
Given these results, some of the usually quoted reasons for a transition to a funded
system do not seem overwhelmingly compelling. Such a transition could change the time path
of the tax burden but not the burden itself The PAYGO system evenly distributes the
financial burden resulting from the gift to the introductory generation over all generations.
Neither Musgrave' s inter-generation equity principle nor more sophisticated welfare
arguments for tax smoothing suggest that it would be wise to shift this burden to the shoulders
of the current generation as could be done with the introduction of a funded system.
Although these results do suggest some straightforward welfare implications, they
should be interpreted with some caution since they have been derived from a partial analytic
approach. While it was not necessary to assume a steady state, all present value comparisons
were made given the time path of the market rate of interest. The exogeneity of the time path
would be strictly justified in a small open economy, but not otherwise. In general, a
redistribution of incomes between the generations will change the growth path of the
economy and the time path of the marginal product of capital. The strict present value
equivalence between the maintenance of the PAYGO system and the transition to a funded
system will then no longer hold. The equivalence will only hold if the comparisons are made
with the same set of factor prices. From a welfare perspective this is not as big a problem as it17
might appear at first sight. If the transition to a funded system is a lump sum redistribution
between different generations, then the endogenous reaction of factor prices will not, in
general, be able to generate a Pareto improvement. For such a possibility to occur it would be
necessary for the impoverished generations to gain more from the endogenous change in
factor prices than they lose by being burdened with an additional tax.
7. Three Equally Unconvincing Reasons for a Transition to a Funded System
Despite this result, it is not impossible to construct models of the transition from a PAYGO
system to a funded system that predict genuine Paretian efficiency gains.9 However, the
economic mechanisms responsible for such results may not always be closely related to the
funded system as such and may also be available without the introduction of a funded system.
7.1. Capital Income Taxation and Growth Externalities
As was shown, the transition to a funded system can be used to concentrate the implicit tax
burden in earlier periods of time. Under a variety of plausible assumptions that deviate from
the plain Ricardian equivalence view, this would reduce private consumption in earlier
periods and would hence increase aggregate savings and investment, thereby stimulating
economic growth.'° More growth will not necessarily imply a welfare increase, given that
there is such a thing as an optimal growth path. However, when the rate of return to capital
Cf. Feldstein (1997) and Kotlikoff (1996) as well as the literature mentioned in the introduction.
0
Amongthe possibilitiesone can list thefollowing.
1. If the explicit tax is a consumption tax with a declining rate, households shift consumption to the
future and increase their savings.
2. Households which are liquidity constrained and would like to borrow against future income, but
cannot, will reduce their present consumption.
3. Households which save but make no bequests to their children, must react to the squeeze of their
lifetime budget constrathts and consume less during their lifetimes.
4. Concentrating the tax burden on earlier periods means redistributing it between long lived dynasties
and. short lived ones, whose chain of descendents is interrupted after the first or only a few generations.
Since short lived dynasties have a higher marginal propensity to consume per period with regard to
wealth transfers than long-lived dynasties do, this redistribution reduces aggregate present consumption
and increases saving.18
exceeds the households' rate of time preference and discount, the additional capital
accumulation resulting from a transition to a funded system may increase the wealth and
welfare of the economy.
One potential reason for a divergence between the rate of discount and the rate of
return to capital is capital income taxation. Households equate their rate of time preference to
the net-of-tax interest rate, and firms equate the marginal value product of capital to the cost
of capital which, in the presence of capital income taxation, exceeds the net-of-tax interest
rate. The rate of interest in the above formulae, r,isin this case the net-of-tax market rate of
interest, because it is this rate at which households can transfer resources to the future and at
which the government can borrow. If the transition generates additional savings, this will not,
at the margin and in itself, change private wealth or welfare, but it will give the government
an extra tax revenue which could then be distributed to everyone. With this distribution,
private wealth and private welfare would increase±1
It is true that the introduction of a funded system generates welfare gains when the
system of capital income taxation is to be taken as given. However, the welfare gains would
also be available if the system of capital income taxation itself could be abolished or replaced
with a better tax system. For example, the introduction of cash flow taxation would
completely eliminate the tax wedge between the marginal product of capital and the rate of
time preference and induce an efficient speed of economic growth, while capital owners
would bear the burden of this form of taxation!2 In the presence of cash flow taxation, the
extra growth generated by a transition to a funded system would not increase the tax revenue
and would not be welfare enhancing.
Capital income taxation drives a wedge between the marginal product of capital and
the consumer rate of time preference, and it implies that more growth is welfare increasing
See Siebert (1998, p.21) for an approach using this argument.
2
SeeMeade Committee (1978) and Shin (1985).19
because the accumulation of capital generates positive fiscal externalities through the
government budget. Other types of positive externalities associated with the accumulation of
capital, which also drive wedges between the social marginal product of capital and the social
rate of time preference, include the spill-over of technological knowledge among innovating
firms as is emphasized by modern growth theory'3 and altruistic utility effects among families
such as those on which the Isolation Paradox'4 is based. These externalities, too, would imply
that private capital accumulation is too low and that the additional growth generated by a
transition to a funded system is welfare improving. However, once again the question is
whether the accumulation of capital might not be accelerated in other ways. Generating
growth through the funded system is a second best policy move which cannot, in itself,
remove the wedge between the social and private returns to capital. A first best policy move
that abolishes this wedge would be the introduction of an investment subsidy such as the
Investment Tax Credit or a program to support private savings.
Apart from that, however, it is not clear whether capital formation is really associated
with positive externalities. Insecure property rights in developing countries imply that natural
resources are transferred too quickly into man-made capital,' and Veblen-type preferences
based on relative income positions imply that the market process generates too much
economic growth.'6
Summarizing, it seems fair to say that the case for a funded system on the grounds that
it mitigates the externality problem by stimulating economic growth is not particularly
compelling, because it is not clear whether, on balance, there are positive growth externalities
and because there would be more direct means to stimulate capital accumulation if there were.
'Seee.g. Romer (1990).
' SeeMarglin (1963) and Sen (1967). 'SeeKonrad, Olsen, and Schöb (1994),
6Seee.g. Corneo and Jeanne (1997),20
7.2. Risk Premia in the Stock Market
A similar argument applies to the relationship between the rate of return to bonds and to
stocks. Normally, the rate of return that can be earned in the stock market is higher than the
one that can be earned in the bond market. Since the latter is used for private and public
discounting, an increase in saving that leads to a stock market investment will, it appears,
increase private wealth and welfare.
However, this appearance could be deceptive, since an investment in stocks incurs
more risk than an investment in bonds, and risk bearing in itself is a disadvantage for the
households involved. Note that the extra return on stocks is not available with every
investment, but on average only. It is a premium for risk taking. If the economy's price of risk
taking is appropriately taken into account, the mere fact that stocks have a higher rate of
return than bonds does not imply that an increase in investment would be a welfare
improvement.
In order for a genuine welfare improvement to occur it would be necessary to
demonstrate that the government has access to better risk consolidation devices than private
investment funds do and that these devices would not be available without the funded system.
'While the former does not sound implausible, the latter is definitely false. If the government
borrows in the capital market and invests the funds thus received in risk bearing assets, it is
able to capture all the gains from its superior risk bearing ability that a transition to a funded
system could possibly generate. A transition to a funded system would not be needed to
capture these gains.
7.3. The Labor Leisure Distortion
In section 6 the pension system was modeled as an intergenerational redistribution device, and
the contribution to the system was split into a savings share and a tax share where the latter
was the necessary payment to compensate for the introductory gains. In fact, however, manypension systems are characterized not only by an intergenerational redistribution, but alsoby
an interpersonal one among the members of the same generation. In the extreme case where
the individual pension entitlement is independent of one's own contribution, the fullamount
of this contribution may be considered a tax.
In this case, large distortions in the labor market must be reckoned with, since the full
amount of the contribution drives a wedge between the marginal product of labor and the
required marginal compensation of the employees. A transition to a funded system would
abolish interpersonal redistribution and reduce the tax burden to the intergenerational
redistribution component, provided it is combined with the establishment of individual
accounts, as is commonly assumed. As argued by Homburg and Richter (1990) and a
subsequent paper by Homburg (1990) this is a potential for welfare improvements.
Again, however, as was demonstrated by Fenge (1995, 1997), this advantage has little
to do with the funded system as such.t7 For one thing, even a funded system could, in
principle, be run on a collective basis, where a person's pension is unrelated to his or her
savings. For another, individual accounts could easily be combined with the PAYGO
system.'8 Indeed, Germany has had such a system since 1957, and Sweden has recently
moved further towards it. In Germany, a person's pension is almost proportional to his or her
contributions.19 Employees in Germany are less attracted by the black market than in other
countries, because they know that they can accumulate pension claims when they declare their
incomes 20
See also Brunner (1996) and Buchholz (2000) for illuminating discussions of this problem.
This issue was extensively discussed in Diamond (1999).
9 The degree of proportionality is not perfect insofaras the timing of contributions during one's lifetime and
early retirement are not reflected in an actuarially fair manner. However, if A works the same years and retires at
the same point in time, but earns snd contributes always twice as much as B does, he will also receive a pension
which is twice as high as that of B. See Wrede (1999) for a welfare analysis of alternative earnings profiles in the
context of a Pareto improving transition.
20 According to a study by Schneider and Enste(2000) Germany's share of black market activities is below the
OECD average.22
When there are individual accounts, then the above analysis fits an individual's
decision problem well. We simply have to assume that the contributions, taxes and savings
introduced above are average values and that a person who makes z % of theaverage
contribution will receive a pension which is z%of the average pension. In this case, the
implicit tax share r is a marginal, as well as an average, share in the contributions.
Assume that the individuals in the above model may differ and that
X, =JX,(i)f(i)diforX, =P,,C,,T
whereX, (i) is the pension, contribution, and tax, respectively, for an individual of type i
/0)isthe frequency density frrnction for the alternative types, and X, is the corresponding
average over all members of the pension system. Suppose individual i's contribution to the
pension system in period tis
C,Ø)=c, a,(i) w,(i)
where c, is the uniform contribution rate, ct,(i) is his labor supply and w,(i) is his wage rate.
Then it follows that individual i's tax burden is given by
7 (i) =t/ C1(i)
and that the marginal and average tax burden on working time is23
ÔT,(i)7(i)
Sct(i)ct(i)
/'
wheret,isstill given by (7).
Given the time path of the market rate of interest, the model of sections 4-6 remains
true regardless of these extensions. In particular, the present value of the implicit tax will
continue to equal the present value of the explicit tax that would have to be raised under a
funded system. It is true that a change in the time pattern of the tax burden that is typically
associated with a transition (unless the case of Proposition 4 applies) would probably cause
the time path of the average labor supply to react and would therefore change the time path of
the labor tax base. However, this would not affect any of the propositions derived above since
they refer to the time path of the implicit aggregate tax revenue rather than that of the tax rate.
Thus, although the time path of labor supply may change after a transition, the present value
of the labor tax revenue will have to cover the government debt implicit to the existing
PAYGO system under all circumstances.
The welfare implication of this result is not trivial since it depends on which definition
of a welfare optimum is adopted, what kind of altruistic links between the generations are
assumed and which possibilities for private intergenerational resource transfers are allowed.
Disregarding intergenerational altruism and resource transfers, and referring to the strict
Pareto criterion, Fenge was able to show that, despite an endogenous labor supply reaction,
the PAYGO system is Pareto optimal. By the spirit of his argument it would be possible to
demonstrate that any transition strategy from a PAYGO system towards a funded system
which makes full use of the possibilities of explicit public borrowing is Pareto optimal, too,
and that no deviation from this strategy is a Pareto improvement.
It is well-known, in general, that the strict Pareto criterion in connection with the
assumption that parents do not care for their children makes Pareto improving policy moves24
difficult to achieve in an intergenerational setting, and it is therefore not very often used in
welfare theoretic model building. The tax literature, for example, typically assumes some sort
of intergenerational welfare function with altruistic links between the generations. In such a
setting, an optimal time path of the wage tax rate, tc,, couldbe derived which minimizes the
utility loss of a representative dynasty given that a present value of tax revenues large enough
to redeem the pre-existing implicit debt is collected.2'
In principle, it is conceivable that there is a debt-using transition path towards a
funded system which generates more dynastic utility than a continued PAYGO system.
However, a plain and rapid transition to a fully funded system is very unlikely to be such a
path. On the contrary, the concentration of the inevitable wage tax burden on only one
generation is probably not an optimal strategy, when reasonable assumptions about dynastic
preferences are made. As the excess burden of a tax is, to the first order of approximation, a
quadratic function of the tax rate, a broad tax base is typically preferable to a narrow one. A
continuing PAYGO system has a very broad base because it consists of the wage incomes of
all subsequent generations. With a sudden transition to a funded system, the tax base is the
wage income of one single generation only. Thus, under normal circumstances, in an
economy that is close to a steady state, it seems that the time path of the labor tax rate is much
closer to the optimum when the PAYGO system is continued than in the case where it is
replaced with a funded system.
A reduction in the excess burden which results from the need to repay the implicit
government debt is conceivable, however, if labor income as such is given up as the tax base.
If a less distortionary tax base than labor income can be found, welfare improvements may, of
course, be possible. However, this possibility does not really lend support to a transition to a
21With double-sidedaltruism the best policy would be that the parent generation disclaims their pensions and the
system is abolished completely. The children could then look after their parents themselves with no labor-leisure
distortion being involved.. However, when parents care for their descendants, and not the other way around, it is25
ffinded system since it would also be possible to choose the less distortionary base for the
contributions to the PAYGO system.
8. Another Reason for a Partial Transition to a Funded System
The previous sections could be understood as a plea for maintaining the PAYGO system, but,
in fact, they are just a quest for better arguments for the introduction of a funded system.
Despite the weakness of the quoted arguments in favor of the funded system a stronger case
for such a system can be made when the imminent crises of the pension systems of the
western world are taken into account. These crises reflect radical changes in the transfers
between the generations, including the transfer enforced by the PAYGO system and the
voluntary resource transfer to the subsequent generation which takes place in the form of
child rearing and educational expenses.
In most of the more developed OECD countries birth rates have declined considerably
over the last few decades and medical progress is continually increasing life expectancy. The
result is a sharp increase in the old-age dependency ratio, i.e. the ratio of people 65 years or
over to the number of younger people 15 years and upwards. Figure 3 shows the problem for
four typical countries, France, Germany, Japan, and the US. Within a century, from 1950
through 2050, the ratio increases roughly threefold. For every pensioner a member of the
workthg age had to nourish in 1950, there will be three pensioners in 2050 if labor force
participation and retirement conditions do not change.
necessary to respect the existing pension claims. The PAYGO system would then have a potentially useful
function as an enforcement device. See Sinn (1998b) for a formal model elaborating on this theme.Figure 3: The old-age dependency ratio for four industrialized countries
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The figure shows that the situation is particularly severe in Germany. There the old
age dependency ratio increases from 14%tonearly 50% within a century. The reason for this
dramatic development is to be sought primarily in the changed fertility rates. In the last
century, Germany had the third highest birth rate in Europe, now it has the third lowest one,
only surpassed by Spain and Italy. Ten Germans have less then seven children over their
lifetimes. Small wonder that the PAYGO system encounters serious problems.
The present German old-age dependency ratio will double, or more than double, up to
2035. Given the replacement ratio —theratio of an average pension to an average wage
income —thiswould mean doubling the contribution rate from the present 20% to 40% of
50%27
wages, and, given the contribution rate, it would mean halving pensions in relation to working
income. In 1992, the German parliament introduced substantial future pension cuts, but even
they will not be able to prevent the contribution rate rising towards 30% in the crucial thirties
of the next century. In any case, a major crisis of the pension system must be expected.
This leads to an argument in favor of a partial funding of the pension system. In the
PAYGO system people expect to receive a pension from their children, but, as there are not
enough children, they need a second source for their pension.22 Savings invested in the capital
market could be such a source. If retirees receive a pension from their savings in addition to
receiving one from their children, they can avoid over-burdening their children and
nevertheless secure a decent life in old age.23
It is true that with such a solution today's working generation would have to bear the
frequently cited 'double burden' because they have to nourish the old with their PAYGO
contributions and to fmance part of their pensions themselves. However, if the cause of the
pension crisis is taken into account, there is nothing strange or unusual in this double burden
that would provide an argument against funding the pensions.
In order to be able to consume in old age and enjoy a decent retirement life, a working
generation has to save or to raise children who will later be able to pay them a pension. Or, to
put it more bluntly, the working generation has to invest in real or in human capital. If it does
not invest in either real or human capital, it will have to starve because nothing breeds
nothing. It has always been the case, and will never be otherwise, that the working generation
has to bear a double burden: raising children and paying for the old. Today's working
generation has preferred not to raise as many children as previous generations did and it has
22
Werding(1999) has argued that the PAYGO system is afunded system,too, except that funding is based on
human rather than real capital. His view also lends support to the considerations developed below. Cf also
Werding (1998) and Sinn (1997,1998a).
23Analternative would be to increase the number of immigrants more than was already assumed for the
calculations underlying figurc 3, for immigrants will indeed generate a huge net fiscal externality in favor of the28
thus decided not to maintain the usual size of the relative voluntary resource transfer to the
subsequent generation. Children just don't play the role in everyday life as they used to do,
and women no longer sacrifice their careers for having large families. Children come later and
in fewer numbers; less time in the course of a mother's live is devoted to their education.24
Even the "dink" family with dual incomes and no kids has become an established way of
organizing lives. This is the main reason for the pension crisis and a strong motive for
introducing a funded pension system. Given that people saved the education expenses and
caused the crisis, they may well now be asked to invest the free money in the capital market
instead of spending it on additional consumption. It is true that the investment for their own
pension is a double burden, but it is the same double burden which they would have had to
bear with a continuous development of the population anyway.
It is useful to rethink this argument in terms of the implicit tax which is part of the
PAYGO contributions. Return for this purpose to the overlapping generations model used
above and consider the current generation of pensioners, the generation of their children who
are currently in working age and the generation of grandchildren as well as subsequent
generations. If all generations have as many children as was usual in earlier times, they will
all bear the normal child rearing costs, will all receive a normal pension and will all pay the
normal implicit tax with their pension contributions. Suppose, however, that today's working
generation has fewer children while the other generations' reproductive behavior remains
unchanged. This will not alter the aggregate present value of the implicit tax to be paid, but
fewer people are available to shoulder its burden. One generation at least will have to bear a
higher implicit tax in per capita terms, but who should that be?
domestic population (see Sinn 1997). However, the pension problem is only one of many aspects an active
immigration policy would have to take into account.
24Public child rearing expenses, too, seem to be lower in coimtries whose fertility rates are low. As casual
empirical evidence it may be noted that Germany not only has one of the lowest fertility rates in the world but,
among the OECD countries, also the one of the lowest shares in GDP spent on public education. The share is
much lower than in the US, for example. See OECD (1996, p. 60).29
At first glance, dynastic-allocative or Musgravian inter-generation equity
considerations seem to suggest a policy of tax smoothing over the generations: it seems
reasonable to require that all generations including the current generation of pensioners share
the extra per capita tax burden. In practical terms, this could imply25
i) a cut of today's pensions along with a reduction in today's contribution rate,
ii) an over-proportional cut of the pensions expected by today's working generation and
iii)an increase in the next working generation's contribution rate.
However, this conclusion can only be drawn if the saved child rearing costs from which the
current working generation benefits are neglected. Taking these savings into account shows
that the current working generation would gain from a policy of implicit tax smoothing at the
expense of their predecessors and descendants. Implicit tax smoothing is not burden
smoothing, because implicit taxes are only part of the burden that a well-functioning PAYGO
system imposes on the working generation.
Focusing on the overall burden of a generation in terms of the sum of its implicit
taxes and its child rearing cost, burden smoothing in the presence of the demographic crisis
requires the imposition of an extra tax primarily on the current working generation, because
this generation saved on child rearing expenses. Thus the pensions to be expected by the
current working generation would have to be cut in line with the lower number of their
children without alleviating their own pension contributions accordingly.
This is the point where the funded systems comes in. If the PAYGO pensions of those
who have fewer children are cut, optimal life cycle planning suggests that at least some of the
spared child rearing cost should be invested in the capital market so as to generate additional
pensions with the proceeds of this investment.26 In other words, it is in the interest of the
25TheGerman policy of freezing real pensions for a while and moderating the increase in the contribution rate in
the next few decades (Nettolohnanpassung, demographischer Fakior etc.) seems to follow this logic.
26Itcan be lefi open here whether voluntary savings are sufficient or whether savings will have to be obligatory.
For this see Homburg (1999) and Fenge/von Weizsacker (1999).30
current working generation to shift the extra part of the implicit tax it has to pay because of its
lower number of offspring to a period in its life cycle where it spares the child rearing costs.27
Obviously, this kind of reasoning is very different from the efficiency arguments in
favor of funded pensions that one finds in the literature. Instead of some fundamental intrinsic
inefficiency, which many economists believe to show up in the rate-of-return difference, it is
the cause of the demographic crisis itself that calls for a funding. If the economy were on a
steady state growth path where a typical family's number of children stayed constant from
one generation to the next, the transition from a PAYGO system to a funded system would
concentrate the total implicit tax burden, which otherwise had to be borne by all subsequent
generations, on the current working generation alone, and this burden seems unjustified since
it comes in addition to the normal burden of raising their children.28 However, given that the
crisis results from the working generation's choice to lower their child rearing expenses, the
imposition of a compensatory implicit tax burden is a plausible reaction.
There are important implications for the useful volume of funding. While the (false)
rate-of-return argument implies that a full transition is advisable to fully exploit the
advantages of the 'better' system, the reason given above can only lend support to partial
funding. Funding with real capital is useful to the extent that 'funding' with human capital is
lacking. More than that is unnecessary.
Another implication relates to the way the extra implicit tax and the necessary volume
of funding could be broken down to the single households within a generation. After all, the
reproductive behavior is not homogeneous within a generation. Some households have a
27 Theease for funding does not apply to the extent that the increase in the dependency ratio can be attributed to
rising life expectancy rather than the low fertility rate. If people Jive longer, but have the usual number of
children, there are no spared resources they could save and invest. The appropriate policy reaction would be
different. It could include an extension of the retirement age, a cut in annual pensions and higher contribution
rates for subsequent generations.
2s
Accordingto calculations carried out at CES for the Council of Advisors to the German Ministry of
Economics, a full and unmitigated transition to a funded system would immediately raise the sum of PAYGO
contributions and the necessary saving to a good 28% which is also the forecast for the contribution rate in an
unchanged PAYGO system for the year 2035. See Wissenschaftlicher Beirat (1998).31
sufficient number of children, others have none, some invest in human capital, others don't. It
would be in the logic of the burden smoothing argument to cut a household's PAYGO
pension in line with the number of children who are missing relative to some target number
and to ask this household for compensatory savings to secure its living standard in old age
with a self-financed ifinded pension, without alleviating its contributions to the PAYGO
system.
In addition to improving the degree of burden smoothing, tailoring the necessary
pension reform to the single households has the advantage of improving the incentive
structure for individual fertility choices. The PAYGO system socializes part of the earnings
capacity of a household's children in that the contributions that these children will make to
the system when in working age will be evenly distributed among all pensioners regardless of
the number of children they reared during their lifetimes. It is an open question to what extent
this socialization effect has contributed to the decline in birth rates, but it is well founded
theoretically and does not seem to be negligible from an empirical perspective.29 Cutting
PAYGO pensions and replacing them with funded pensions to the extent that a household
chooses not to invest in human capital reduces the degree of socialization and mitigates the
distortion in the individual fertility choices resulting thereof.
9. Conclusion
Politicians want to be right, but scientists want to be right for the right reason. This preference
explains why most of the space of this paper was devoted to a discussion of the 'wrong'
reasons. It was shown that the PAYGO pension system is not, in its essence, an inefficient
insurance device that absorbs economic resources but a zero-sum game between the
generations. In present value terms, there is nothing to be gained from a transition to a funded
29SeeNugent (1985), Cigno/ Rosati (1996), Werding (1997), and Sinu (1998b).32
system even though the latter offers a permanently higher rate of return. The sum of the
implicit and explicit tax burdens that result from the need to respect the existing pension
claims is the same under all systems and transition strategies.
This statement had to be qualified in the presence of capital income taxation, risk
premia and a consideration of an endogenous labor leisure choice, but nevertheless these
modifications were seen not to lend any particular support to the transition from a PAYGO
system to a funded system.
The arguably 'true' reason which was offered in the last section of the paper relates to
an extended view of burden smoothing when both the tax implicit to the PAYGO system and
the cost of child rearing is taken into account. In the presence of the demographic crisis,
burden smoothing implies partial funding: where human capital is lacking, and to the extent
that it is, real capital could be used to fill the gap.
References
Aaron, H. (1966): "The Social Insurance Paradox," Canadian Journal of Economics and
PoliticalScience 32, 371-374.
Beckmann, K. (2000): "A Note on the Tax Rate Implicit in Pay-as-you-go Public Pension
Contributions," Finanzarchiv, forthcoming.
Borsch-Supan, A. (1998): "A Public Pension System on the Verge of Collapse," in: H. Siebert
(ed.), Redesigning Social Security, Mohr Siebeck: Tubingen.
Breyer, F. (1989): "On the Intergenerational Pareto Efficiency of Pay-as-you-go Financed
Pension Schemes," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 145, 643-658.
Brunner, J. K. (1996): "Transition from a Pay-as-you-go to a Fully Funded Pension System:
The Case of Differing Individuals and Intragenerational Fairness," Journal of Public
Economics 60, 13 1-146.
Buchholz, W. (2000): "Efficiency of Pension Schemes. A Note," mimeo, University of
Regcnsburg.
Corneo, G. and 0. Jeanne (1997): "On Relative Wealth Effects and the Optimality of
Growth," Economics Letters 54, pp. 87-92.
Diamond, P. (1999), ed.: Issues in Privatizing Social Security, Report of an Expert Panel of
the National Academy of Social Insurance, MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass., London,
England.33
Feldstein, M. (1995): "Would Privatizing Social Security Raise Economic Welfare?" NBER
Working Paper 5281.
(1997): "Transition to a Fully Funded Pension System: Five Economic Issues," NBER
Working Paper 6149.
Feldstein, M., and A. Samwick (1998): "The Economics of Prefundung Social Security and
Medicare Benefits," in: H. Siebert (ed.), Redesigning Social Security, Mohr Siebeck:
Tubingen.
Fenge, R. (1995): "Pareto-efficiency of the Pay-as-you-go Pension System with
Intragenerational Fairness," Finanzarchiv 52, 357-363.
(1997): Effizienz der Alterssicherung, Physica: Heidelberg.
Fenge, R., and J. von Weizsacker (1999): "To What Extent are Public Pensions Pareto-
Improving? On the Interaction of Means Tested Basic Income and Public Pensions,"
CESfo Working Paper 197.
Geanakopolos, J., 0.5. Mitchell, and S.P. Zeldes (1998): "Would a Privatized Social Security
System Really Pay a Higher Rate of Return?" NBER Working Paper 6713.
Homburg, S. (1990): "The Efficiency of Unfunded Pension Schemes," Journal of Institutional
and Theoretical Economics 146, 640-647.
(1991): "Interest and Growth in an Economy with Land," The Canadian Journal of
Economics 24, pp. 450—459.
(1997): "Old Age Pension Systems: A Theoretical Evaluation," in: H. Giersch, ed.,
Reforming the Welfare State, Springer: Berlin, Heidelberg and New York, pp. 233-
246.
(1999): "Compulsory Savings in the Welfare State," mimeo, University of Hanriover.
forthcoming in Journal of Public Economics.
Konrad, K.A., T.E. Olsen, and R. Schob (1994): "Resource Extraction and the Threat of
Possible Expropriation: The Role of Swiss Bank Accounts," Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 26, pp. 149-162.
Kotlikoff, L. (1996): "Simulating the Privatization of Social Security in General
Equilibrium," NBER Working Paper 5776.
Kotlikoff, L., K. Smetters, and J. Walliser (1998): "The Impact of Transiting to Privatized
Social Security," in: H. Siebert (ed.), Redesigning Social Security, Mohr Siebeck:
Tub in g en
Ludeke, R. (1988): "Staatsverschuldung, intergenerative Redistribution und umlagefinanzierte
gesetzliche Rentenversicherung: Eine andere Sicht der Lasten durch em negatives
Bevolkerungswachstum," in:S.Klaus and P. Kiemmer,Wirtschaftliche
Strukturprobleme und soziale Fragen, Duncker und Humblot: Berlin.
Marglin, S.A. (1963): "The Social Rate of Discount and the Optimal Rate of Investment,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics 77, pp. 95-1 11.
Meade Committee (1978): The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation. Report of a
Committee chaired by Professor J. E. Meade (The Institute for Fiscal Studies), Allen
& Unwin: London.
Niehans,J.(1966):"EinevernachlassigteBeziehung zwischen Bodenpreis,
WirtschaflswachstumundKapitalzins,"SchweizerischeZeitschrfrtfür
Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik 102, pp. 195-200.34
Nugent, J. (1985): "The Old-age Security Motive for Fertility," Population and Development
Review 11, 75-97.
OECD (1988): Reforming Public Pensions, OECD Social Policy Studies No. 5.
(1996): Education at a Glance, OECD: Paris.
Romer, P. (1990): "Endogenous Technological Change," Journal of Political Economy 98,
pp. S71-S102.
Schneider, F., and D. Enste (2000): "Shadow Economies around the World —Size,Causes,
and Consequences," Journal of Economic Literature, forthcoming.
Sen, A.K. (1967): "Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of Discount," Quarterly Journal
of Economics 81, pp. 112-124.
Siebert, H. (1998): "Pay-as-You-Go versus Capital-Funded Pension Systems: The Issues," in:
H. Siebert (ed.), Redesigning Social Security, Mohr Siebeck: Tubingen.
Slim, H.-W. (1985): Capital Income Taxation and Resource Allocation, North-Holland:
Amsterdam, New York etc.
(1997): "The Value of Children and Immigrants in a Pay-as-you-go Pension System:
A Proposal for a Partial Transition to a Funded System," NBER Working Paper 6229.
(1998a): "Comment on Axel BOrsch-Supan," in: H. Siebert (ed.), Redesigning Social
Security, Mobr Siebeck: Tubingen.
(1998b): "The Pay-as-you-go Pension System as a Fertility Insurance and
Enforcement Device," NBER Working Paper 6610.
(1999): "Die Krise der Gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung und Wege zu ihrer Losung,"
Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed.), Jahrbuch 1998, Beck: Munchen, pp.
95-119.
Thum, M., and J. von Weizsacker (1999): "Implizite Einkommensteuer als MeBlatte für die
aktuellen Rentenreformvorschlage," Ifo Discussion Paper 64, Ifo Institute, Munich.
Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft (1998): Grundlegende
Reform der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft,
Studienreihe No. 99: Bonn.
Werding, M. (1997): "Pay-as-you-go Public Pension Schemes and Endogenous Fertility,"
mimeo, Department of Economics, University of Passau.
(1998): Zur Rekonstruktion des Generationenvertrages, Mohr Siebeck: TUbingen.
(1999):"UmlagefinanzierungalsHumankapitaldeckung," Jahrbucher für
Nationalokonomie undStatistik 218, pp. 491-511.
Wrede, M. (1999): "Pareto Efficient Pay-as-you-go Pension Systems with Multi-Period
Lives," JahrbucherfurNationalokonomie undStatistik2l9, pp.494 -503.